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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II
Dale E. Bennett*
INDICTMETS
The much cited case of State v. McDonald1 held a burglary
indictment charging burglary of the "American Hat Company"
fatally defective for failure to specifically allege that a "building
or structure" had been burglarized. In State v. Wright,2 the
Louisiana supreme court refused to extend the technical Mc-
Donald holding, and upheld an indictment which simply charged
burglary of "Rinaudo's Red and White Grocery, located at 2532
Government Street." The court concluded that "grocery" con-
noted a structure or building more emphatically than "hat
company." Similarly, State v. Bowers" upheld a burglary
information which described the burglarized premises as "West
Madison Garage." This, according to the court's succinct per
curiam, "connotes in ordinary language a structure devoted to
the garage business." 4
The importance of making sure to state all elements of the
crime, where the so-called long form indictment is employed,5
is shown by State v. Baker.6 In Baker,'an indictment for aggra-
vated crime against nature was held fatally defective for failure
to specify by which circumstance, of several enumerated in the
definition of the aggravated crime, the offense was committed.
The care and precision with which long form indictments must
be formulated was further illustrated by State v. SpinaJ where
the information for malfeasance in office had simply followed
the broad general language of the code definition of that crime
in alleging that the defendant intentionally failed to perform his
duties as "lawfully required of him" as a Baton Rouge police
officer. In approving the trial judge's ruling which had sustained
a motion to quash, the supreme court reaffirmed the previous
holding that "[w]hen the statute characterizes the offense in gen-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934).
2. 254 La. 521, 225 So.2d 201 (1969).
3. 260 La. 436, 256 So.2d 435 (1972).
4. Id. at 438, 256 So.2d at 435.
5. LA. CODs CeiM. P. art. 464 requires "a plain, concise and definite writ-
ten statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."
6. 261 La. 233, 259 So.2d 306 (1972).
7. 261 La. 397, 259 So.2d 891 (1972).
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eral or generic terms, an indictment or information charging the
offense in the words of the statute is insufficient and the specific
facts upon which the charge is based must be set out." In
Baker, the indictment would have been sufficient if it had fol-
lowed one of the specific enumerations of the statute. In Spina,
where there was no such specification and elaboration, a specific
statement of facts showing how the crime was committed was
required.
In State v. Raby,9 the information charged aggravated arson,
a crime for which a specific (short) form is provided by article
465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the prosecutor
did not elect to employ the specific form and thus was required
to set out all elements of the offense charged. The information
was held insufficient for failure to allege foreseeable danger to
human life which "is the gravamen of aggravated arson."'10 The
importance of utilizing the specific form, where one is available
under article 465, is shown by the fact that the prescribed
specific form, alleging that "A.B. committed aggravated arson
of a dwelling located at... ," would have been clearly sufficient.
Where the short form is employed, care must be exercised
to be certain that the sacramental language of the specific
form is followed. In State v. Thomas," the specific form charging
forgery had been loosely drawn and considerable legal legerde-
main was necessary for the supreme court to conclude that the
information had adequately stated the nature of the defendant's
act, i.e., the forging of the instrument and signing a false signa-
ture. The decision was a close one, and unfortunately space
does not permit a comparative analysis of the well-stated major-
ity and dissenting opinions. This writer tends to agree with the
practical approach of Justice Tate's majority opinion. In essence,
it would appear that omission of the word "by" did not render
the nature of the charge unclear or the information fatally
defective. Also, Justice Tate's practical construction of the charge
was supported by the conjunctive charging authority stated in
article 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the
Thomas case indicates the prime importance of meticulous
adherence to the language provided in the specific (short) forms.
8. Id. at 403, 259 So.2d at 893.
9. 259 La. 909, 253 So.2d 370 (1971).
10. Id. at 913, 253 So.2d at 371.
11. 260 La. 784, 257 So.2d 406 (1972).
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A number of additional significant rules were reaffirmed in
this series of cases. The Raby decision held that where the long
form indictment is employed, failure to state all elements of the
crime may be considered ex proprio motu on appeal even though
the defect had not been urged by defense counsel, either by
motion to quash, motion in arrest, or assignment of error. Basic
sufficiency of the indictment is essential to a valid trial and the
omission of an essential element of the offense charged comes
within article 920 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a
reversible error "discoverable by a mere inspection of the
pleadings and proceedings.' 2
In Spina, the supreme court held that a bill of particulars,
which had stated the specific acts upon which the charge was
based, was not part of the formal charge and "cannot amend,
aid or validate an otherwise invalid or insufficient information
or indictment." 18
In State v. Thomas, the supreme court followed an express
provision of article 577 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that
"[t]he state shall not be required to allege facts showing that the
time limitation [for the institution of a prosecution] has not
expired . . . ." This provision of the 1966 Code had overruled
the prior jurisprudential rule that the running of time limita-
tions must be negatived in the indictment-a rule which had
been the source of many confusing decisions and "neat cases. '14
Article 577, the effects of which are clearly and succinctly
summarized in Justice Tate's opinion and footnotes, 15 expressly
provides that, when the time limitation issue is raised, "the state
has the burden of proving the facts necessary to show that the
prosecution was timely instituted." It would appear that the
best defense procedure is to urge the time limitation by motion
to quash and avoid the necessity of going to trial, but the defense
is of such a basic nature that article 577 permits it to be "raised
at any time, but only once." Thus, it may be urged after con-
viction by motion in arrest or habeas corpus.
12. This provision was based on and is in conformity with articles 503
and 560 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.
13. 261 La. at 404, 259 So.2d at 893.
14. See LA. CODM CRIM. P. art. 577, comment (d) (2).
15. 260 La. at 790-94, 257 So.2d at 409.
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NOTICE OF INTENDED INTRODUCTION OF CONFESSION
OR INCULPATORY STATEMENT
The Code of Criminal Procedure requirement that the state
must give the defendant written notice of its intention to intro-
duce a confession or inculpatory statement prior to beginning
the opening statement 8 has been liberally construed. Where
the failure to provide timely notification was inadvertent and
in good faith, and the court found that the defendant had not
been taken by surprise or prejudiced in his defense, the non-
compliance was treated as harmless error in State v. Lacoste.17
In State v. Jackson,18 the lack of notification was neither inad-
vertent nor non-prejudicial. In fact, the state had actually
informed the defendant and the court that no inculpatory state-
ments given to any officer would be introduced, and had agreed
to suppress all such statements. In addition to alleging surprise
by the introduction of testimony as to the defendant's inculpa-
tory statement, defense counsel claimed that the defendant would
not have taken the stand if he had known such statement was
to be introduced in evidence. On the basis of this showing,
the supreme court held that the failure to comply with the
advance notice requirement was reversible error. In between
the clearly established prejudicial error of Jackson and the
inadvertent non-compliance of Lacoste, it will be interesting to
see where the "harmless error" line may be drawn. It would
seem that failure to give proper notice should, in order to fully
effectuate the purpose of the Code requirement, normally raise
a sufficient presumption of prejudice to call for a new trial.
In State v. Himel,19 the supreme court logically held that the
first four provisions of the general normal order of trial article
of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2 do not apply to bench
trials. It further held that the written notice of intention to
introduce a confession or inculpatory statement was not required
in judge-tried cases. Since the notice requirement is intended
as a protection against surprise by the sudden and unanticipated
use of such incriminating statements, the justification for limit-
ing it to jury trials is difficult to perceive.
16. LA. CODw CRIM. P. art. 768.
17. 256 La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970).
18. 260 La. 561, 256 So.2d 627 (1972).
19. 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972).
20. LA. COD CuM. P. art. 765.
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PROSECUTION FOR INCLUDED NONCAPITAL OFFENSE
State v. Ford2' involved the procedure to be followed when
a district attorney elects to prosecute a defendant under a murder
indictment for the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
When the prosecution is for manslaughter, a nine out of twelve
verdict will suffice, and other special procedures for capital
trials will not apply. In Ford, the district attorney amended a
murder indictment, on the day of the trial, to charge man-
slaughter. After trial and conviction, defense counsel urged
that the district attorney was without authority to amend and
reduce a grand jury indictment.
In affirming the conviction, Justice Sanders stressed the
district attorney's codal authority to prosecute the lesser crime
of manslaughter.22 He also relied on State v. Doucet,2 8 where the
supreme court had squarely upheld the district attorney's
authority to abandon the greater crime charged (murder) and
go to trial on the lesser included charge (manslaughter). In
Doucet, the reduction of the charge was by motion in open court
and no formal amendment of the indictment was necessary.
Possibly the better course to follow in Ford would have been
by motion to proceed on the reduced charge as in Doucet; or it
might have been appropriate to move for the court to amend
the indictment to conform with the reduced prosecution for
manslaughter. This authority might be found by analogy to the
court's amendatory powers under articles 487 and 488 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. It should be noted that no new
or different crime is being charged since the murder charge
necessarily includes the lesser and included crime of man-
slaughter.
In Ford, the supreme court did not pass upon the propriety
of the procedure followed, since defense counsel had not made
timely objection. Even with timely objection, the procedure
followed was, at most, "harmless error," since the district attor-
ney could have validly proceeded with the manslaughter trial
without resorting to the possibly invalid amendment. In future
cases, it would appear safest to either follow the informal Doucet
procedure, or to simply file an information charging man-
slaughter and proceed to trial on that separate lesser charge.
21. 259 La. 1037, 254 So.2d 457 (1971).
22. Relying on LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 61.
23. 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933).
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CHALLENGE OF JUROR ON GROUND OF PARTIALITY
One of the most frequently urged challenges for cause is
that "(2) the juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his
partiality. '24 The necessarily wide discretion of the trial judge
in ruling on challenges on this ground is illustrated by State v.
Higginbotham,25 where the trial judge had ruled that a prospec-
tive juror was not subject to challenge for cause because he
was a social acquaintance and member of the same Rotary
Club as one of the partners of the hardware company which had
been burglarized. "It is not per se evidence of partiality," stated
Justice Summers, "that a prospective juror is friendly with the
party injured by the offense. The relationship must be such
that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the
juror in arriving at a verdict." Similarly, another juror who
was a "pretty good" acquaintance of the officer who arrested
the defendants was found not subject to challenge. Justice Sum-
mers' conclusion to this part of the supreme court's decision
significantly stated, "[i]t is essential that the trial judge have a
wide latitude in deciding upon a juror's qualifications. The
particular facts and circumstances of each case are to be care-
fully considered before an appellate court is warranted in find-
ing that this latitude has been breached."26
SEQUESTRATION OF WrrNEssEs-EFFECT OF VIOLATION
In State v. Wills,27 the witnesses in a burglary trial had been
sequestered and ordered by the court not to discuss the case
with anyone other than the district attorney or defense counsel.28
After the sequestration order, the district attorney sent uni-
formed police officers to the homes of two of the witnesses who
were taken to police headquarters and required to make state-
ments. Defense counsel's motion for a mistrial was denied by
the trial judge. In reversing the conviction on appeal, the
supreme court clearly rejected the district attorney's contention
that the interrogating police were "one of the investigating arms
of the district attorney's office." Thus, the issue was squarely
presented as to whether police interrogation of sequestered
defense witnesses was ground for a mistrial.
24. LA. CODB C~ux,. P. art. 797.
25. 261 La. 983, 261 So.2d 638 (1972).
26. 261 La. at 992-93, 226 So.2d at 641.
27. 260 La. 707, 257 So.2d 378 (1972).
28. The sequestration order was pursuant to LA. Conr CiuM. P. art. 764.
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The majority opinion was based on the premise that the
right of sequestration included a right to have defense witnesses
free from police interrogation which might influence or at least
color their later testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Sanders relied on the oft-quoted statement that:
"The objective of witness-sequestration is to prevent wit-
nesses from being influenced by the testimony of other
witnesses and to strengthen the roll [sic] of cross-examina-
tion in exposing false testimony. The primary purpose of
the instruction limiting discussion of the case to the district
attorney and defense counsel is to prohibit the witnesses
from discussing the case with each other other. '29
The broad majority construction of the purpose and scope
of the witness sequestration may pose future problems. What
about interrogation of a sequestered witness by an investigator
in the district attorney's office? Can the effects of oppressive
and intimidating police interrogation of a key witness be cured
by ordering a mistrial? Such impermissible official action might
mean, as Justice Sanders infers, that irreparable damage has
been done which will preclude any fair trial, and thus be a
bar to a retrial of the case. The facts stated in Willis do not
show any coercive questioning by the police, and so it would
appear that defendant's rights were properly safeguarded by
the procedure followed by the trial judge. In any event, the
purpose and scope of the sequestration order may have been
given a new and somewhat unexpected dimension by the Wills
decision. In any event, the decision is not authority for a denial
of the district attorney's right to properly interrogate, through
his staff or investigators, sequestered witnesses.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
RELEVANcY
Past Acts of Misconduct
The admissibility of other criminal acts, a matter which
recently has so much plagued and divided the court, was again
29. 260 La. at 712, 257 So.2d at 379.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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